There is a surprising absence of common factor variables in market microstructure models. In this study we extend Huang and Stoll's (1997) spread cost decomposition model to incorporate a market wide buying and selling pressure cost component. We find strong evidence that specialists take this common factor cost component into consideration when they set bid and ask quotes. Evidence that specialist firms take the next logical step and specifically manage their firm wide stock inventories is ambiguous. The common factor is found to be largest for securities with the highest trade frequencies. This size effect diminishes and becomes insignificant under the new decimal trading regime. The relative importance of the common factor spread component decreases as the pricing grid becomes finer, but remains highly significant.
I. Introduction
The difference between the prices at which a liquidity supplier is willing to buy an asset and that at which he is willing to sell, the bid-ask spread, is the subject of much interest to financial market participants and securities regulators. The size of the spread measures market quality, defines liquidity and ultimately determines whether the liquidity supplier is successful.
Existing market microstructure models incorporate at most three cost factors that market makers consider in setting the spread for a specific stock: their order processing costs, their inventory holding costs for the stock, and the costs arising from trading against a better informed counterparty. In addition to these factors, market watchers would expect that market-wide trends might be a factor in setting the spread. Modern portfolio theory suggests that portfolio considerations should also play a role.
We develop a spread decomposition model that incorporates these finance fundamentals.
The theoretical model decomposes spreads into a market wide buying and selling pressure component and a specialist firm inventory component, as well as the recognized three components. The existence of common components to short-horizon returns, order flow, and liquidity has received a large amount of attention in the literature recently. Studies by Chordia et.al. (2000) and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) focus on common determinants of liquidity, providing evidence that stock liquidity proxies, including bid-ask spreads, exhibit common variation over time. Chordia et.al. find that spreads co-move with market-wide liquidity.
Several reasons are proposed for the existence of commonality in liquidity. First, common variation in trading volume leads to co-movements in the optimal inventory levels, which in turn results in co-movements in individual bid-ask spreads. Second, inventory risk depends on volatility, which could have a market component. Third, program trading of simultaneous large orders, as well as the trades of institutional funds with similar investing styles, might exert common pressure on dealer inventories. These reasons for commonality could be labeled market wide buying and selling pressure. Large groups of stocks are bought (sold) at the same time, simultaneously decreasing (increasing) market maker inventory levels and increasing (reducing) prices of many stocks. Ho and Stoll (1983) provide an alternative explanation for commonality in liquidity.
Liquidity suppliers hold portfolios of stocks and therefore take a portfolio perspective in adjusting inventories. When, for example, buying a stock at the bid, the liquidity supplier will not only lower the bid and ask prices of that stock, but will also lower the bid and ask prices of correlated stocks, the sale of which would hedge his position in the purchased stock.
Conversely, if other stocks are subject to buying pressure, the liquidity supplier may decide not to lower the bid and ask prices of the stock, in order to encourage its sale and thereby hedge the purchases of other stocks. The portfolio approach allows for the possibility that the quotes for a specific stock are adjusted by a different amount than would be implied by its own information content or inventory effect. In particular, buying and selling pressure in other stocks will produce quote changes as liquidity suppliers attempt to keep their overall portfolios in balance.
This explanation for commonality in liquidity will be referred to as specialist firm portfolio buying and selling pressure. Specialist firm portfolio and market buying and selling pressure differ in that the former relates to a group of stocks that are serviced by the same specialist or specialist firm, whereas the latter relates to the market, a much larger set of stocks that are serviced by different specialist firms.
Our spread decomposition model accommodates these two potential sources of commonality. It is based on one of the models proposed by Huang and Stoll (1997) , hereafter HS, which in itself is a generalization of many other models. These previous spread decomposition models focus on individual stocks, decomposing the spread into stock specific adverse selection costs, inventory holding costs, and order processing costs. In omitting determinants common to portfolios of stocks, traditional spread decomposition models may incorrectly quantify the proportion of the bid-ask spread attributable to adverse selection, stock specific inventory, and order processing costs. The estimation of adverse selection cost component has important implications beyond market microstructure research for pricing financial assets and for ascertaining required rates of return. Easley et.al. (2002) find that the probability of information-based trading significantly affects the required rate of return for a stock. Accordingly, errors in the estimation of adverse selection cost components may lead to biased asset return expectations. We test our model empirically using NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) data. Our results show that a significant proportion of the spread is explained by market buying and selling pressure, and that this proportion is largest for the most actively traded stocks on the NYSE.
Omitting this cost component from the spread decomposition model significantly biases the estimates for adverse selection, stock specific inventory costs, and order processing costs. For example, for February to June 2001, the average adverse selection costs for 311 S&P 500 constituent stocks rise significantly from 12.6 percent to 14.6 percent with the addition of the market buying and selling pressure variable, while the average stock specific inventory costs drop significantly from 19.5 percent to 17.2 percent. On average, market buying and selling pressure comprises 3.26 percent of the spread. For 1997, when prices were quoted in eighths (prior to June 28, 1997) and sixteenths, the market buying and selling pressure component comprises, on average, 8.95 percent and 9.42 percent of the spread, respectively.
The specialist firm portfolio component is also significant, although less conclusively so. Hasbrouck and Seppi pose a second question. They ask whether their results would be different for smaller stocks than the Dow Jones stocks they consider. We find a significant difference in commonality in spreads between the least and most liquid stocks for trading under minimum ticks of eighths and sixteenths, but the significance of this difference disappears under decimal trading. We do find that for the smallest stocks the adverse selection costs are significantly higher (28.9 percent versus 5.69 percent) and the stock specific inventory costs are significantly lower (4.97 percent versus 23.8 percent) than they are for the largest stocks.
Finally, we use three sample periods that enable us to observe the impact of price discreteness on the components of the spread. We find that the size of the minimum price increment especially affects the estimate of the stock specific inventory costs, dropping from 62.0 percent under eighths to 51.6 percent under sixteenths to 17.2 percent under decimals.
In the following section we develop a spread decomposition model that incorporates market buying and selling and specialist firm portfolio pressures. The quote midpoint, M t , is calculated from the bid-ask quotes that prevail just before a transaction. P t is the transaction price. We define Q t to be the buy-sell trade indicator variable for P t . It equals +1 if the transaction is buyer initiated and occurs above the quote midpoint, −1 if the transaction is seller initiated and occurs below the midpoint, and 0 if the transaction occurs at the midpoint.
In inventory models, changes in quotes affect the subsequent arrival rate of trades. After a dealer sale (purchase) at the ask (bid), a dealer raises (lowers) the bid (ask) relative to the fundamental stock value in order to increase the probability of a subsequent public sale (purchase). The dealer is compensated for inventory risk because the expected change in the quote midpoint is positive after a dealer sale and negative after a dealer purchase. The probability of a purchase (sale) is greater than 0.5 just after a sale (purchase). In other words an inventory model induces negative serial covariance in trades. As trades reverse, quotes reverse.
This characteristic can be used to identify the stock-specific inventory component of the spread.
If π is the probability that the trade at t−1 is opposite in sign to the trade at t-2 (or with probability π − 1 ), the conditional expectation of the trade indicator at time t-1, given ,
where the superscript k refers to individual stock k. Assuming that the market knows equation
(1), the change in the unobservable fundamental value of stock k is modeled as follows:
is the quoted spread at time t, is the percentage of the half-spread attributable to adverse selection, and is the serially uncorrelated public information shock. Equation (2) decomposes the change in
t into two components. First, the change in V t reflects the private information revealed by the last trade (as in Copeland and Galai, 1983, and Milgrom, 1985) , excluding the information in Q t−1 that is not a surprise. Second, the public information component is captured by . When = 0.5, the sign of the trade is unpredictable and the second term in equation (2) is equal to zero.
While V t is unobservable, we do observe the quote midpoint, M t . According to inventory theories of the spread, in order to induce inventory equilibrating trades liquidity suppliers adjust the quote midpoint relative to the fundamental value on the basis of accumulated inventory (Ho and Stoll, 1981) . Additionally, modern portfolio theory suggests that the specialist should also consider the inventory position in correlated stocks in the firm's portfolio (Ho and Stoll, 1983) .
Thirdly, the finding of commonality in market liquidity and trends in the market, i.e., market buying and selling pressure, constitute another consideration. Capturing all of these considerations, and assuming that all trades are of size one, the midpoint is related to the fundamental value according to can be interpreted as the proportion of the half-spread attributable to costs related to market buying and selling pressure. To allow a similar interpretation of the size of the coefficient as the proportion of the half-spread attributable to costs related to the specialist firm portfolio, we substitute an alternative specification using an indicator variable for the specialist firm portfolio, , similar in design to the market buying and selling indicator variable, for the double summation of indicators: Ho and Stoll (1983) model the relationship between quote changes in a specific stock and inventory changes in other stocks. Under their model assumptions the quote adjustment in stock k in response to a trade in asset n depends on cov(R k , R n )/σ 2 (R n ). In equation (3) it is implicitly assumed that all the stocks are perfect substitutes.
D
thresholds that determine whether the indicator variable is sufficiently different from zero to distinguish it from random noise. n refers to a number of securities, either the number that liquidity suppliers span to get an indication of the market direction or the number of stocks in the specialist firm's portfolio. The superscript k is a counting variable for the stocks that constitute the market portfolio, M, or the specialist portfolio, S. is then determined by the last trade of stock k before time t. We find minimal differences in the explanatory power of the two alternative model specifications in equations (3) and (4). Combining the first difference of equation (4) with equation (2) results in a spread decomposition into adverse selection costs (α), stock specific inventory holding costs (β k t Q 1 ), costs related to market buying and selling pressure (β 2 ) and specialist firm portfolio holding costs (β 3 ):
Our inclusion of these two aggregate buy-sell indicator variables results in a very general model that identifies two sources of commonality. The studies of Chordia et.al. (2001) and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2002) simply state that there is commonality in liquidity. Chordia et.al. argue that multiple stocks simultaneously receive a buy (sell) order as style managers buy (sell) these stocks for their portfolios. In the original HS model the effect on spreads of these transactions is captured in the stock specific inventory holding costs, β 1 . The market buying and selling pressure component in our model, β 2 , is relevant when a marketmaker, expecting that a market rally (slump) will increase the probability that the next order will be a buy (sell), increases (decreases) the midpoint of all of his quotes relative to his perception of the fundamental value. This alteration, or shading, of the marketmaker's quotes is driven by the ex-ante expected change in the order arrival probabilities due to short term trends in the market, rather than to individual stock considerations. The specialist firm portfolio indicator variable, β 3 , has a different origin. It is a direct consequence of the arguments put forward in Ho and Stoll (1983) . The specialist will set the quote midpoint relative to the fundamental value as a function of the specialist firm inventory, as short and long positions in other stocks offset the inventory risks of stock k.
Because the aggregate indicator variables are highly correlated, in the empirical section of this paper we consider restricted versions of the model as well as the full model to arrive at definite conclusions about the relevance of the two variables.
B. Comparison to existing models
The model nests several existing models. If we restrict β 2 = β 3 = 0 , our model is equivalent to HS's equations (21) and (26). Furthermore, HS show that with additional restrictions, including π = 0.5 and a constant spread S t = S, their model collapses to several of the previous spread decomposition models. These include Roll (1984; α = β 1 = 0), George et.al. (1991;  β 1 = 0), Glosten and Harris (1988; β 1 = 0), and Madhavan et.al. (1997) , an extension of Glosten and Harris in which the surprise in trade flow is allowed to affect estimated values. The most important feature of HS's specification is that it was the first model to separate adverse selection and inventory holding costs. Our model retains this feature while also identifying commonality components of the spread.
HS do propose an extended spread decomposition model encompassing portfolio buying and selling pressures. However, their model, which makes use of an aggregate buy-sell indicator variable based on a portfolio of stocks, distinguishes only the adverse selection and specialist firm portfolio inventory components of the spread. They are somewhat vague on the exact realization of this approach. Initially they refer to Ho and Stoll's (1983) notion that suppliers of liquidity hold entire portfolios and a buy (sell) affects not only the price of the stock in question, but potentially that of all stocks in the portfolio. In their implementation, however, HS do not use the specialists' specific portfolios. Instead they rely on the 19 stocks in their sample as a proxy for the indicator. Our model improves on HS's proposed extension in several important aspects.
HS impose a number of restrictions that we relax in our model. In equation (30) in their paper, HS assume β 1 = 0, that is, the deviation from the fundamental value is determined only by the portfolio indicator variable. We allow the spread to be affected by the stock specific inventory as well as introducing the market buying and selling pressure and the specialist firm portfolio components. Our spread is free to vary over time, whereas HS assume a constant spread. In their extended model, HS implicitly assume that π = 0.5. HS's restrictions, π = 0.5, β 1 = 0, and S t = S, can easily be tested empirically to assess the relevance of our model's added flexibility.
In testing our models, we also improve on HS's methodology. We retain t as it was specified in the other HS models. In their portfolio trading pressure variation of the model, HS fix t to 5-minute intervals and use the last observation in each 5-minute interval, with the aim of synchronizing the data of the 19 time-series. However, as many trades and quote revisions may take place during a 5-minute interval, quotes, trades and the resulting buy/sell indicator may not accurately reflect the inventory position of the market maker. Furthermore, the lengthy interval will make the market buying and selling indicator very noisy. Because of our extensive data set, we are able to form portfolios that contain only stocks for which the specialist firm actually makes the market. With our market buying and selling pressure and specialist firm portfolio indicator variables, we make a distinction between the two interpretations of aggregate portfolio trading pressure.
C. Additional considerations for the aggregate indicator variables
If, in setting the quote midpoint, the specialist considers market buying and selling pressure, β 3 may be significantly different from zero regardless of whether the specialist also considers her firm's portfolio. The Q M indicator variable (coefficient β 2 ) is more robust, so we would expect β 3 ≤ β 2 . Hence, if β 3 > β 2 , we can conclude that the specialist firm portfolio is influential in setting the quote midpoint. However, even if β 3 ≤ β 2 , the specialist firm portfolio may be important. We check this possibility with the following procedure. The average β 3 is computed for the stocks in the specialist firm portfolio. In subsequent estimations for the same stocks, we use the (incorrect) Q S from each of four other specialist firms. As such, for each specialist firm we get one correct estimate for β 3 and four incorrect estimates for their stock portfolio that are based on the inventory position, Q S , of the other specialist firms. If the specialist firm portfolio is influential, the correct estimate should be larger than the four incorrect estimates. In addition, comparing the differences in the parameter estimate using the correct specialist firm portfolio variable, Q S , to that of an indicator variable of a random portfolio of stocks from other market making firms, labeled 'other', should show that the parameter estimates for the arbitrary group of stocks is significantly smaller than those for the correct specialist firm portfolio. If this is not the case, we can conclude that the specialist firm portfolio is not a factor in quote midpoint choice.
III. Data
All data for the study are extracted from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) tapes from the NYSE. To examine the model in equation (6), the trades and quotes of all S&P 500 stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX are extracted for all of 1997 and for February to June, 2001.
The data set includes the 20 stocks that constitute the Major Market Index (MMI) used by HS.
In the construction of our data set we deviate from HS's study and follow the suggestion of Madhavan et.al. (1997) and exclude trades at the midpoint. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) report that, on average, NYSE specialists participate in only 30 percent of all stock trades.
Trades at the midpoint appear to be the most logical candidates for trades that take place between traders rather than through the specialist. In excluding these, we can then assume a binomial distribution for Q M and Q S since, when midpoint trades are excluded, each Q k can only have two outcomes. 3 We use the five percent critical values to determine the thresholds U j and D j .
The market buying and selling variable, Q , defined in equation (6), is based on the last trades and quotes for the 446 stocks that were part of the S&P 500 index in 1997, and the 421 stocks that were part of the S&P 500 index in 2001.
M t
4 The specialist firm variable, , also defined in equation (6), is based on the same stocks that were used for the 2001 sub-sample period for the market buying and selling variable. We create the data sets for the two sample periods to cover three trade regimes. The first data set comprises the year 1997, covering a To be assigned to a specific specialist firm, stocks had to be with that specialist firm for an entire sample period. This procedure ensures the best possible comparability of the pricing regimes of eighths and sixteenths while not overly truncating the decimal trading sample. Figure 1 shows the stocks grouped by their specialist firms.
Insert Figure 1 here
The two graphs underscore the concentration process which has occurred in the three years between the samples. At the beginning of the year 1997 the NYSE had 34 specialist firms;
at the end of June 2001 only 13 specialist firms remained. Our data set concentrates on the larger and more liquid stocks listed on the NYSE. The market maker firms we investigate also make markets for a substantial number of smaller issues. Table 1 lists the top five specialist firms and the number of stocks in our sample for which they make markets.
Insert Table 1 here
To ensure the integrity of the data set, the analysis is confined to transactions coded as regular trades and quotes that are best bid or offer (BBO) eligible. We subject the data to a Each trade is paired with the last quote posted at least one second prior (and no more than 120 seconds prior to limit the stale quote problem). This approach differs from, for example, HS (1997) and Ball and Chordia (2001) , both of whom use a five second quote delay. The choice of delay interval is important since the proper sequencing of the trades and quotes is at the heart of the model specification and the parameter estimates are sensitive to the choice of delay interval.
The source for the five second quote delay is Lee and Ready (1991) , who found that the majority of quote revisions take place in the five seconds prior to the trade time stamp. However, Lee and Ready used 1992 ISSM data for their study. Since June of 1995, the trade time for NYSE issues in the TAQ data set is the Consolidated Trade System (CTS) time stamp, and, since March 1996, the quote time is the Consolidated Quote System (CQS) time stamp. These time stamps are of high quality and do not require lagging, as is demonstrated in Figure 2 8 . The vast majority of the quote revisions take place at or after the trade time stamp.
Insert Figure 2 here
6 Trades labeled as cancelled or error are excluded as are any trades that may affect the sequence of trades including cash, belatedly reported bunched, next day delivery, seller's option, average price, opened after trading halt, and sold sales trades. Non-firm quotes and quotes with size zero are also excluded. Observations at the beginning of each trading day that include lagged variables from the previous day are also excluded.
7 Large jumps in prices are inspected and reversal checks are programmed to find erroneous quotes in the data set.
The entire set of filter rules is available upon request.
Following HS (1997) , if the quotes remain unchanged, we aggregate same-price sequential trades. In effect, this approach, called bunching, treats a cluster of trades at the same price with unchanged quotes as a single order. Without bunching, HS find probabilities of trade reversals that are often smaller than 0.5. The low probabilities result in negative adverse selection costs, theoretically not permissible under the class of spread models HS consider.
Furthermore, as mentioned, we incorporate the suggestion of Madhavan et.al. (1997) and explicitly omit trades that were executed at the quote midpoint. Since trades at the quote midpoint are unlikely to involve the market maker, they should not affect her inventory or profits. 9 Spread sample statistics of the resulting data set are reported in Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 here
The (percentage) spread drops significantly at the one percent significance level for the progressively finer pricing grids.
IV. Estimation procedure
Following HS, we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure to estimate all models. The advantage of the GMM procedure is that it only imposes weak distributional assumptions, an especially important property since the error terms include rounding errors.
to be a vector function such that for the model in equations (1) and (6), it is . Under the GMM procedure, the parameter estimates chosen are those that minimize the criterion function
is the sample mean of ) ,
and W is a sample symmetric weighting matrix.
Initially W is set equal to the identity matrix. Using the estimate
and optimize the criterion function in equation (9) again with the updated weighting matrix.
Repeat this iteration process until the parameter estimates converge. Hansen (1982) proves that, under weak regularity conditions, the GMM estimator T ω is consistent and
All models are exactly identified.
V. Results
In discussing our results we begin with the original HS spread decomposition model. Section B presents the results for our new model, restricting β 3 to zero. Section C reports results for the complete model with market buying and selling and specialist firm portfolio pressures. In section D we evaluate the impact on the various parameter estimates of the changes to the price quotation regime. Lastly, in section E we test whether the omission of important variables biases the estimates in the reduced models and whether actively traded stocks have different parameter estimates than less actively traded stocks.
A. Huang and Stoll model
We estimate the HS model for the 20 stocks in the MMI, comparable to HS's tests with 1992 data, by imposing the restrictions β 2 = β 3 = 0 on our model [equations (1) and (6) were part of the S&P 500 index for (at least part of) these sub-sample periods. Insert Table 3 here
The attribution of greater than 100 percent of the spread to the stock specific inventory component, β 1 , for three of the stocks under decimal trading occurs when the probability of a trade reversal, π, is close to 0.5. When π equals 0.5 the parameters in equation (6) are unidentified, resulting in large and unreliable estimates for adverse selection and stock specific inventory costs. To circumvent this problem, we also report averages over all stocks for which π is at least 0.025 away from 0.5. In the subsequent discussion we will focus on these more reliable estimates.
Panel A of Table 3 is most comparable to the results in HS (1997, 
B. Market buying and selling pressure
The results for the model incorporating market buying and selling pressure and maintaining the restriction β 3 = 0 are presented in Table 4 .
Insert Table 4 here
The coefficient for the market buying and selling indicator variable, β 2 , is highly significant and positive for all but one of the MMI stocks, the MMI average and the S&P 500 average, C. Specialist firm portfolios and market buying and selling pressure Table 5 reports the results for the model without restrictions. The coefficient for the market indicator variable, β 2 , is significantly larger than zero for three quarters of the individual MMI stocks, whereas the average β 2 taken over all stocks in the specialist firm portfolios are significantly larger than zero for all specialist firms in all three sub-sample periods. The coefficient for the specialist firm portfolio indicator variable, β 3 , is significantly larger than zero for half of the individual MMI stocks, whereas the average β 3 taken over all stocks in the specialist firm portfolios is significantly larger than zero for all specialist firms in all three sub- Table 4, i.e., without the specialist firm portfolio indicator variable, β 2 is equal to 0.0786. Part of the significance of the specialist firm portfolio indicator variable in our model appears to come from the relevance of the market indicator variable. To illustrate the real contribution of the specialist firm indicator variable, in Table 6 we report the average β 3 for the five specialist firms for each of the three sub-samples, using both the correct specialist firm indicator variable for a stock and the (incorrect) indicator variables of the other specialist firms.
Insert Table 6 here An asterisk indicates that the average β 3 for the incorrect indicator variable is significantly smaller (at the five percent level) than the average β 3 for the correct indicator variable. Where the difference as tested in Table 6 is not significant, the significances reported in Table 5 of the specialist firm portfolio indicator variables may be spurious. Table 6 illustrates that there are only a few specialist firms for which we find convincing evidence that the significance of the specialist firm portfolio indicator variable may actually be due to specialist firm portfolio 
D. The impact of the price quotation system on spread decomposition models
The results span three price quotation regimes: eighths, sixteenths and hundredths. It is interesting to compare the outcomes of, for example, the HS model in the sub-sample periods as shown in Table 3 , to see whether price and quote discreteness biases the estimates of adverse selection and stock specific inventory components of the spread. Ball and Chordia (2001) find that, in the coarser price grids, the adverse selection component is small and most of the quoted spread is attributable to rounding errors.
Insert Table 7 here
We find that the proportion of the spread attributed to adverse selection costs, α, is not significantly different across the three sub-samples for the MMI stocks (Panel A). For these large, heavily traded stocks only one of the differences in means tests is significant, that of the HS model from eighths to sixteenths. For the S&P 500 stocks (Panel B) we find small negative average adverse selection costs for the two coarser pricing grids. However, in the decimal pricing regime this incongruity disappears, suggesting that the fine pricing regime may solve the problem of rounding error biased parameter estimates. The stock specific inventory holding costs decrease significantly from eighths to sixteenths to decimals for both model specifications and for both the S&P 500 stocks and the MMI stocks, for the latter decreasing from 0.486 (0.496) to 0.313 (0.371) to 0.177 (0.153). That is, for coarser price grids, all models appear to over-estimate inventory holding costs. The evidence shows that the minimum price increment does influence the attribution of spread cost components.
E. Missing variables bias and size effects
To measure potential biases in the estimation of adverse selection costs and stock specific inventory costs due to the omission of the market buying and selling pressure, in Table 7 Lastly we consider whether trading activity has an influence on the estimated spread components as suggested by Easley et.al. (1996) . In Table 8 we use the number of trade observations as a proxy for trading activity and split the data set into quartiles.
Insert Table 8 here
The market buying and selling pressure variable, β 2 , is, under eighths and sixteenths, significantly larger for the most actively traded stocks than it is for the least actively traded 
VI. Conclusion
We develop a spread cost component decomposition model, based on Huang and Stoll (1997) , that includes a market buying and selling pressure cost component as well as a specialist firm portfolio variable. We find strong evidence for the existence and significance of a common spread component under all three share price regimes. While market makers consider the market factor when setting bid and ask quotes, we find evidence that only market makers of some specialist firms might consider their firms' current portfolio position in addition to market wide buying and selling pressures and their individual inventory of specific stocks in posting their bid and ask quotes. The common market factor is largest for securities with the highest trade frequencies. However, this size effect diminishes as the price grid becomes finer. The magnitude of the common market factor also decreases as the pricing grid becomes finer, but remains highly significant in all three pricing regimes. Lastly, we find that the probability that buyer (seller) initiated trades are followed by seller (buyer) initiated trades falls considerably as the pricing grid becomes finer. This innovation in trading practices may necessitate a reevaluation of many existing theoretical microstructure models. For each trade that is not preceded or followed by another trade for 20 seconds the number of quote revisions is counted and divided into bins reflecting how many seconds before or after the trade they occurred. The top five specialist firms and the number of S&P constituents traded at the NYSE for which they were designated specialists. The Huang and Stoll model in equations (1) and (4) is estimated, providing estimates for the adverse selection costs, α, inventory holding costs, β 1 , and the probability of a trade reversal, π. Panel A covers the period January 2 through June 23, 1997, when the minimum price increment at the NYSE was one eighth. Panel B provides the estimates for the period June 24 through December 31, 1997, when the minimum price increment at the NYSE was one sixteenth. Panel C provides the estimates for the period February 2 through June 30, 2001, when the minimum price increment at the NYSE was one cent. Avg. MMI denotes the average statistics for all 20 individual stocks. Avg. S&P denotes the average statistics for all NYSE stocks that are part of the S&P 500 index. a indicates that any stocks for which 0.475 < π < 0.525 are excluded from the calculation. For Panels A and B the reported average is for 20 MMI stocks, and the 439 remaining S&P stocks (formerly 446). For Panel C the reported average is for the 12 remaining MMI stocks, and the 311 remaining S&P stocks (formerly 421). ** and * denote statistical significance at the one and five percent level, respectively. The market buying and selling pressure model in equations (1) and (6) is estimated, providing estimates for the adverse selection costs, α, inventory holding costs, β 1 , market buying and selling pressure, β 2 , and the probability of a trade reversal, π. Panel A covers the period January 2 through June 23, 1997, when the minimum price increment at the NYSE was one eighth. Panel B provides the estimates for the period June 24 through December 31, 1997, when the minimum price increment at the NYSE was one sixteenth. Panel C provides the estimates for the period February 2 through June 30, 2001, when the minimum price increment at the NYSE was one cent. Avg. MMI denotes the average statistics for all 20 individual stocks. Avg. S&P denotes the average statistics for all NYSE stocks that are part of the S&P 500 index. a indicates that any stocks for which 0.475 < π < 0.525 are excluded from the calculation. For Panels A and B the reported average is for 20 MMI stocks, and the 438 remaining S&P stocks (formerly 446). For Panel C the reported average is for the 12 remaining MMI stocks, and the 311 remaining S&P stocks (formerly 421). ** and * denote statistical significance at the one and five percent level, respectively. The market buying and selling pressure model in equations (1) and (6) with the restriction β 3 = 0 is estimated, providing estimates for the adverse selection costs, α, inventory holding costs, β 1 , market buying and selling pressure, β 2 , and specialist firm portfolio imbalance, β 3 . Panel A covers the period January 2 through June 23, 1997, when the minimum price increment at the NYSE was one eighth. Panel B provides the estimates for the period June 24 through December 31, 1997, when the minimum price increment at the NYSE was one sixteenth. Panel C provides the estimates for the period February 2 through June 30, 2001, when the minimum price increment at the NYSE was one cent. Avg. MMI denotes the average statistics for all 20 individual stocks. Avg. S&P denotes the average statistics for all NYSE stocks traded by the top five specialist firms that were part of the S&P 500 index. a indicates that any stocks for which 0.475 < π < 0.525 are excluded from the calculation. ** and * denote statistical significance at the one and five percent level, respectively. The table reports the average component of the spread attributable to specialist firm portfolio component, β 3 , for the model provided by equations (1) and (6). The average β 3 is computed for the specialist firms in the first column, with the bold numbers representing the correct specialist firm indicator variable. The other numbers present averages when the incorrect specialist firm indicator variable is used in equation (6). The symbols ** and * denote that the average coefficient is significantly smaller than the average coefficient of the correct specialist indicator variable (in bold) at the one and five percent level, respectively. For example, the correct specialist indicator variable for specialist 1 is Q S (1), and the corresponding coefficient is tested vis-à-vis the other coefficients in the same row of the table, and vis-à-vis the average coefficient of Q S (1) for 'other' stocks which is in the same column. Specialist names and numbers of stocks are as reported in Table 1 . This table reports t-statistics for testing whether the averages for adverse selection costs, α, stock specific inventory costs, β 1 , and market buying and selling pressure costs, β 2 , reported in Tables 2 and 3 
